UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

7-24-2009

Credit Bureau of E. Idaho, Inc. v. Lecheminant
Respondent's Brief Dckt. 36381

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Credit Bureau of E. Idaho, Inc. v. Lecheminant Respondent's Brief Dckt. 36381" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 102.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/102

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
CREDIT BUREAU OF EASTERN IDAHO,)
1
NC., an Idaho corporation,

1
Appellants,

) Docket No. 36381-2009
)
) BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS, SANDY

VS.

JEFF D. LECHEMINANT
LECHEMINANT,

and

LISA) MOULTON AND EASTERN IDAHO
) REGZONAL MEDICAL CENTER
)

Respondents.
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Madison County
The Honorable Brent J. Moss, presiding
Bryan D. Smith
SMITH, DRISCOLL &ASSOCIATES, PLLC
PO Box 5073 1
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0731
Attorneys for Appellants
Marvin M. Smith
SMITH & BANKS, PLLC
591 Park Avenue, Suite 202
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Attorneys for Respondents
Sandy Moulton and Eastern Idaho Regional
Medical Center

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITES ...............................................................................
ii
STATEMENT OF CASE ...................................................................................1
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS ......................................................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................. 3
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ...................................................................... 4
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................5
A.

CBEI DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO ASSERT THAT ..........................5
IDAHO CODE 5 11-204 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

B.

IDAHO CODE § 11-204 IS A VALID CONSTITUTIONAL ......................... 7
STATUTE THAT HAS NEVER BEEN REPEALED

C.

LC. 5 32-912 DOES NOT ALLOW THE GARNISHMENT
IN THIS CASE

D.

THE DEBT WAS NOT INCURRED FOR THE ..........................................14
BENEFIT OF "THIS" COMMUNITY

E.

THE PRINCIPLE OF EXTENSION PROTECTS .........................................15
THE WAGES OF SANDY MOULTON

F.

SANDY MOULTON'S WAGES ARE NOT SUBJECT ................................. 19
TO GARNISHMENT PER THE IDAHO SUPREME
COURT'S HOLDING IN MILLER V: MILLER,
113 IDAHO 415 (1 987)

G.

THE CASE OF ACTION COLLECTION SERVICES, ........ ............................. 2 1
INC., IS NOT CONTROLLING IN THE INSTANT CASE

H.

THE PLAINTIFFIAPPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED ....................................22
TO ATTTORNEY'S FEES

.......................... 13

CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................
24

.
.
.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ....................

25

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
CASES:

Page(s)

Action Collection Service, Inc. v. Seele, 138 Idaho 753, .............................
.
.
. . . . .4, 9, 21, 22
69 P.3d 173 (Ct. App. 2003)
Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, ............................................................................................
898 P.2d 1081 (1995)

9, 10, 14

First Idaho Cor oration v. Davis, 867 F.2d 1241, ......................................................................15
1243 (9if:.
Cir. 1989)
Freeburn v. Freeburn, 97 Idaho 845, 849, ................................................................................
555 P.2d 385,389 (1976)
Harrigjeld v. District Court, 95 Idaho 540, ........................................................................
51 1 P.2d 822 (1973)

15

16, 17,

Hiller v. Cenarusa, 106 Idaho 571, 578, ......................................................................................
22
682 P.2d 525 (1984)

In Re Moore, 269 BR 864 .............................................................................................................19
(BR D. Idaho 2001)
McMillan v. United States Fire Ins. Co.,
48 Idaho 163,270 P.220

....................................................................................... 9

Mason v. Pelkes, 57 Idaho 10, .....................................................................................................
12
59 P.2d 1087 (Idaho 1936)
Miles v. Idaho Power Company, 116 Idaho 635,
778 P.2d 757 (Idaho 1989)..................................................................................................6
Miller v. Miller, 113 Idaho 415, 420, ...........................................................................4. 19, 20, 22
745 P.2d 294,299 (1987)
Murphey v. Mui~hey,103 Idaho 720, .........................................................................................16
653 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1982)
Neveau v. Neveau, 103 Idaho 707, ..............................................................................................
16
652 P.2d 655 (Ct. App. 1982)
Peters v. Narick, 270 S.E.2d 760, ....................
.
...................................................................... 18
767 (VJ.Va. 1980)

St. Lukes Regional A4edical Center v. Board of County
Coininissioner ofAda County. 146 Idaho 753. 203 P.3d 683 (2009) ...............................
20

Tarbox v. Tax Comi~zission.107 Idaho 957. .................................................................................
6
695 P.2d 342 (1985)
Twin Falls Bank &Trust Co. v. Joan F. Holley, ..........................................................
11 1 Idaho 349. 723 P.2d 893 (Idaho 1986)

10. 1 1. 12.

RULES:
Idaho Code ij 11-201...............................................................................................................
20. 21
Idaho Code $ 11-204....................................

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 7. 9. 12. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21

Idaho Code 5; 12- 120..................................................................................................................... 23
Idaho Code ij 12-120(1) ..............................................................................................................

23

Idaho Code 5 12-120(3) ................................................................................................................23
Idaho Code ij 12-120(5) ...........................................................................:....................................23
Idaho Code ij 28-45- 104 ...........................................................................................................

18

Idaho Code ij 32-906(1) ..................................................................................................................7
Idaho Code ij 32-910 ....................................................................................................................... 8
Idaho Code $ 32-91 1...................................

..................................................................................
8

Idaho Code $ 32-912 ................................................................................................. 12, 13, 15, 17

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PlaintiffIAppellant, Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho (CBEI) has

appealed

from

the

District Court's Memorandum Decision affirming the decision of the Magistrate Court in
denying the PlaintiffIAppellant's Motion to Contest Exemption and granting the Defendant's
Claim of Exemption. The PlaintiffIAppellant is appealing the District Court's decision as to
whether PlaintiffIAppellant has standing to constitutionally challenge an exemption statute
(Idaho Code § 11-204) and whether a constitutional right of PlaintiffIAppellant has been
violated, together with the issue of the denial of PlaintiffIAppellant's request for attorney's fees.
As a backdrop to the central issues identified above, are the issues of the operation of the
community property system, as found in Idaho statutes, and the interplay of that community
property system with creditor-debtor rights in the State of Idaho.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The beginnings of the instant case was the filing of a Colnplaiilt by CBEI, the instant
PlaintiffIAppellant, in the Magistrate Division of the District Court of Madison County. The
Complaint was filed on February 14, 2006. R. pp. 7-9. The Complaint generally alleged that
moneys were due and owing by the Defendants, Jeff D. Lecheminant and Lisa Lecheminant in
the sum of $391.16. The Complaint alleged that the Defendants were "husband and wife, who
incurred the debts, as alleged herein, for community purposes." R. p. 8, p. 4
The Magistrate Court entered default in favor of the CBEI on March 26, 2006, in the sum
of$833.16. R. pp. 11-12.

Thereafter, CBEI attempted collection of the Judgment by means of a Continuing
Garnishment. See, e.g., R. pp. 14-18.
The Magistrate Court, per Judge Mark Rammell, rescinded his Order for Continuing
Garnishment and instructed CBEI that a continuing garnishment order would not be entered by
the Magistrate Court. See, e.g., R. p. 47.
Thereafter, CBEI served a Writ of Execution and a Notice of Garnishment on Eastern
Idaho Regional Medical Center to garnish the wages of Sandy Moulton, the current wife of Jeff
D. Lecheminant. The garnishment was served on or about September 26,2007. R. p. 48.

A Claim of Exemption was asserted by EIRMC for itself and on behalf of Sandy
Moulton, stating that an exemption was being claimed pursuant to Idaho Code

5 11-204. R. p.

25.
CBEI filed a Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption on October 17,2007. R. pp. 21-23.
The Magistrate Court held a hearing on the Motion to Contest the Claim of Exemption
and upon the claim of exemption. Said hearing was conducted on October 23,2007. Thereafter,
the Magistrate Court entered an Order denying the Motion to Contest the Claim of Exemption
and Granting the Claim of Exemption. R. pp. 53-54.
CBEI filed its Notice of Appeal (from the Magistrate Court) with the District Court on
February 28,2008. R. pp. 56-59.
The District Court issued an Order Govelili~lgProcedure on Appeal (R. pp. 60-62). The
District Court conducted a hearing and issued an opinion on February 11,2009. R. pp. 100-103.

The PlaintiffIAppellant, CBEI filed a Notice of Appeal on March 12, 2009. R. pp. 105-

STATEMENTS OF FACTS
The instant case was initiated by Complaint doclceted on February 14, 2006, wherein
Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho, Inc. (CBEI) sued Jeff D. Lecheminant and Lisa Lecheminant for
the stun of $391.16. R. pp. 7-9. In the Complaint, CBEI alleged that Jeff D. Lecheminant and
Lisa Lecheminant were "husband and wife, who incurred the debts . . . for community purposes."

R. p. 8. A default judgment was entered in favor CBEI on March 28, 2006 in the sum of
$833.16. R. pp. 11-12.
Subsequent to the default judgment, the Lecheminants divorced and thereafter Jeff
Lecheminant married Sandy Moulton, who was and is employed by Eastern Idaho Regional
Medical Center (EIRh4C). CBEI first attempted to obtain an Order of Continuing Garnishment.
R. pp. 14-18.
The Magistrate Court, per Judge Rammell, rescinded the Order of Continuing
Garnishment and advised the CBEI that orders of continuing gamislunent would not be issued by
the Magistrate Court. See R. p. 18 and R. p. 47.
CBEI then resorted to a Writ of Execution, listing the Defendants as Jeff D. Lecheminant
and Lisa Lecheminant, with a Notice of Garnislunent to EIRMC. R. pp. 51, 52. As stated, the
Notice of Garnishment was directed to the employer of Sandy Moulton, EIRMC, a general acute
care hospital located in Idallo Falls, Idaho. Sandy claimed an exemption, pursuant to Idaho Code

5

11-204. R. pp. 25-26. A Claim of Exelnption was doclteted on October 15, 2007 by EIRMC

and by Sandy Moulton. Upon the hearing of the Claim of Exemption, the Magistrate Court
upheld the exemption contained in Idaho Code

5

11-204. R. pp. 53-54. CBEI appealed the

Magistrate's decision to the District Court. After hearing and considering the arguments, the
District Court entered its Memorandum Decision, which was docketed on February 11, 2009.
The Memorandum Decision of the District Court upheld the decision of the Magistrate Court. R.
pp. 100-104. Thereafter, CBEI filed its Notice of Appeal on March 12,2009. R. pp. 105-108.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

CBEI does not have standing to assert that Idaho Code

5

11-204 is

unconstitutional.
2.

Idaho Code 3 11-204 is a valid constitutional statute that has never been repealed.

3.

I.C. 3 32-912 does not allow the garnishment in this case.

4.

The debt was not incurred for the benefit of "this" community.

5.

The principle of extension protects the wages of Sandy Moulton.

Sandy Moulton's wages are not subject to garnishment per the Idaho Supreme
6.
Court's holding in Miller v. Miller, 1 13 Idaho 41 5 (1987).

7.

The case of Action Collection Services, Inc, is not controlling in the instant case.

8.

The PlaintiffIAppellant is not entitled to attorney's fees.

ARGUMENT
CBEI DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO ASSERT THAT IDAHO CODE
204 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

A.

5 11-

111 the usual course, this Court has set out the procedure for a challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute based on an equal protection argument. This Court has stated as
follows:
"In addressing equal protection violations, the Court must first identify the
classification being challenged and, second, it must determine the constitutional
standard of review. Id. The Statute will only be found to deny equal protection
under the rational basis test iE (1) the classification is totally unrelated to the
state's goals, and (2) there is no conceivable state of facts that will support the
state's classification." Venter v. Sorrento Delaware, Inc., 141 Idaho 245, 251,
108 P.3d 392, 398 (Idaho 2005); See also, Are1 v. T&L Enterprises, Inc., 146
Idaho 29, 189 P.3d 1149 (Idaho 2008).
In the District Court, the District Court Judge identified two problems that CBEI had with
its,chailenge to the constitutionality of Idaho Code $$ 11-204. Those two problem areas are: (I)
CBEI does not fit into the classification of those excluded from the benefits of Idaho Code 5 11204
violated by the statute.
As to classification, it cannot be argued that CBEI is a married man, attempting to protect
his separate property and the "special" classification of community property established in Idaho
Code

5

11-204 ("The rents, issues and profits of separate property and compellsation due and

owing for his personal services) from execution against his wife. The District Court, though not
fully articulating the argument, recognized by his ruling that CBEI did not fit into this
classification.

The second problem area for CBEI recognized by the Court is the violation of some
constitutionally protected right. Rights that have been enumerated in the Constitution (e.g., free
speech, free exercise of religion, right to counsel, etc.) have been held to be protected from
government interference.

In addition to the rights enumerated in the Federal and State

Constitutions, other rights have been found to be protected under the umbrella of equal
protection. Some of those rights that have been found to be protected are: The right to travel, the
right to privacy, wluch encompasses the right to many, the right to educate children, right to
abortion, and the right to procreation. Other rights that have "won" protection are the right to
vote, the rights of the mentally ill, freedom of association, housing, and contraception. See, e.g.,

Tarbox v. Tax Coinnzission, 107 Idaho 957,695 P.2d 342 (1985).
In the instant case, there has been no delineation or recognized reservation of a
constitutional riglit or of a statutory right of a creditor to execute against certain property that has
the protection of an exemption created by legislative fiat.
As the Appellant correctly points out, this Court has recognized standing when a party
has a "personal stake" in the outcome of the litigation. This exception to being part of the class
for challenge purposes is found when the party requesting recognition of standing suffers a
"distinct, palpable injury and there is a fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed
injury and the challenged conduct." See, e.g., Miles v. Idaho Power Conzpny, 116 Idaho 635,
778 P.2d 757 (Idaho 1989). For purposes of this case, this Court must determine that CBEI has a
personal stake in the outcome of this litigation and that the distinct injury that it suffers from has
a causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. This means this

Court must conclude that the inability of CBEI to execute against the colnrnunity property of a
non-party, non-debtor married woman is a distinct palpable injury and which is specific to CBEI
(as opposed to the general population) and that this injury is the result of the operation of LC.

5

For reasons stated elsewhere in this Brief, it is the contention of the Respondent that
CBEI does not have the specific right to execute; but in the alternative that the doctrine of
extension ought to be employed in the instant case, with the benefit of the legislation in question
being extended to the excluded class -married men. This argument should end the discussion of
injury and causal connection to the injury.
Based upon the foregoing, the Respondent would urge this Courl to conclude that the
Appellant has not met the classification requirements for standing and has not met tlie
"exceptional case" exception for standing in tile instant case.

B.

IDAHO CODE § 11-204 IS A VALID CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE THAT HAS
NEVER BEEN REPEALED.
In order to place the remainder of this section in context, it is necessary to con~pletea

short review of community property tenants and principles.
To begin with, there is no doubt that wages earned from the parties during marriage are
community property. Idaho Code ij 32-906(1) states:
All other property acquired after marriage by either husband or wife is com~nunity
propel-ty. The iiiconie of all property separate or community, is cominunity
property unless the conveyance by which it is acquired provides or both spouses,
by written agreement specifically so providing, declare that all or specifically
designated property and the income from all or the specifically designated
property shall be the separate property of one of the spouses of the income from

all or specifically designated separate property be the separate property of the
spouse to whom the property belongs. Such property shall be subject to the
management of the spouse owning the property and shall not be liable for the
debts of the other member of the community.
Idaho statutes are also clear that the separate property of either spouse is not liable for the
debts of the other spouse that were contracted or incurred before marriage. Unfortunately, as
many commentators have stated, these statutes only provide what property is not liable and do
not state what property is liable.

There is no express statutory statement as to whether

community property is liable for antenuptial debts. See, e.g., Idaho Code

5

32-910 (separate

property of husband not liable for debts of wife contracted before marriage) and Idaho Code

5

32-91 1 (separate property of the wife is not liable for debts of her husband, but is liable for her
own debts contracted before or affer marriage).
Idaho Code § 11-204 states:
All real and personal estate belonging to any married woman at the time of her
marriage, or to which she subsequently becomes entitled in her own right, and all
the rents, issues and profits thereof, and all compensation due or owing for her
personal services, is exempt from execution against her husband.
This statute creates a special kind of community property. Professor of law, W.J.
Brockelbank, noted in his 1962 book, The Community Property Law of Idaho at pp.265-66 as
follows:
The Idaho legislature of 1881 set up a special kind of community property, viz.,
"rents, issues and profits" of the wife's separate property and "all compensation
due or owing for her personal services" (both of wliich are conm~unityproperty in
Idaho) and provided that this special kind of community property should be
"exempt from execution against her husband." (See fnl on page 21 of this brief)

The Idaho Supreme Court, in McMillan v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 48 Idaho 163,270
P.220 held:
As to the earnings of a maried woman, not living separate and apart konl her
husband, on account of her personal services, the exemption applies only to
such earnings as are due and owing. After the earnings have been paid, or
converted into other property, the exemption granted by said section no
longer obtains.
Id. at 280 P. 222 (emphasis added).
Now for the devilment. This Coui?, in Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 898 P.2d 1081
(1995) stated in dicta as follows: "Parties often marry with separate ante-nuptial debts, and those
debts are payable from community property." The court cited to two ancient cases, Holt v.
Empey and Gustin v. Byam. This mischief was then talcen up by the appeals court in the case of
Action Collection Service, Inc. v. Seele, 138 Idaho 753, 69 P.3d 173 (Ct. App. 2003). The sad
part of this commentary is that the Court of Appeals understood exactly what they were doing
and what the Bliss case actually was precedent for, given the issues in that case. In the Action
case, the Court of Appeals stated:
Both Holt and Gustin were decided at a tiine when the husband was given sole
power to manage and control the community property by statute. In 1974, the
legislature amended LC. 9 32-912, giving the husband and wife equal
management and control of the community property. See 1974 Idaho Session
Laws, Ch. 194 Section 2. Despite the change in tile management and control of
the colnmunity property, and in spite of any doubt concerning the continued
vitality of Holt and Gustin, those cases were cited with approval by our Supreme
Court in Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170,898 P.2d 1081 (1995).
In that case, the court recognized that parties often marry with separate
antenuptial debts. Citing Holt and Gustin, the court observed in dicta that the
separate antenuptial debts of a husband or wife are payable from cominunitv
property.

Although the court in Bliss was not presented with the situation facing us in this
case, where a judgment creditor is attempting to garnish one spouse's community
property wages to satisfy that spouse's separate antenuptial debt, the court's
holding was not limited to the facts of that case and we perceive no reason to do
so. To prevent Action from levying against Seele's wages to collect on its
judgment and to allow Seele to avoid her responsibility for the debts encompassed
by Action's judgment would result in marital bankruptcy, particularly if Seele has
insufficient separate property to justify the judgment. Hence, although Seele
argues to the contrary, she remains responsible for the unpaid debts constituting
Action's judgment and her community property wages should not be placed
beyond Action's reach to satisfy its judgment. Id. at 138 Idaho 753, 178.
(emphasis supplied)
Therefore, dicta which did not apply to the controverted issues in the original cited case,
is expanded by the Court of Appeals into a rule of law that is now supposed to govern the instant
action, even though in Seele the spouse (Seele) was a member of the original marital community
as opposed to the situation in the instant case, where Sandy Moulton is not the original
contracting or judgment debtor spouse.
If one wishes to stretch precedent beyond the bounds of the original case, a better
reference would be to the case of Twin Falls Bank &Trust Co. v. Joan F. Holley, 111 Idaho 349,
723 P.2d 893 (Idaho 1986). In that case, this Court ruled that:
Generally speaking, a creditor must obtain a judgment to collect on a debt,
whether it is based on contract, tort or other obligations. The exception would be
if the obligation were secured by a mortgage or some other form of security
interest. Once a creditor obtains a judgment, he is able to obtain on his debt by
execution on the debtor's assets. "These judicial procedures do not change
whether dealing with a single or married debtor. The difference is the type of
property that is subject to execution or attachment for the debt involved."
(Citation omitted). Under the facts of this case, a debtor-creditor relationship
existed only between the bank and respondent's ex-husband, John Holley. The
debt evidenced by the June 26, 1981 promissory note was incurred by John
Holley for the benefit of the marital community. However, respondent Joan

Holley, not having signed the note, was not contractually liable for the debt
evidenced by the promissory note; only John Holley signed and is liable for the
note. . . .The phrase "comnunity debt" is correct terminology insofar as it is used
to signify a debt incurred for the benefit of the marital community. However, to
the extent the phrase is used to imply the existence of a "community debtor," the
phrase is in-precise and misleading. The marital community is not a legal entity,
such as a business partnership or corporation. (Citations omitted). While one may
properly speak of a "corporate debtor," tliere is no such entity as a community
debtor. See, Williams v. Paxton, 98 Idaho 155, 559 P.2d 1123 (1977); (Citations
omitted). To the extent a lending institution enters into a creditor-debtor
relationship with either member of the marital community or with both members,
it does so on a purely individual basis. Thus, the lending institution may have a
creditor-debtor relationship with either spouse separately or with both jointly. As
stated earlier, the commuliity property systeln does n o t affect the fundamental
principles governing such a relationship and the procedures required of a creditor
in order to collect upon his debt. Rather, the coill~lluliityproperty systeln merely
affects the type or kinds of property which the creditor may look for satisfaction
of his unpaid debt. . . .
The debt upon which the bank is asserting this claim against Mrs. Holley was
evidenced by the promissory note executed solely by Mr. Holley on June 26,
1981, which had renewed an earlier note. At the time the bank had a claim
against Mr. Holley, which it could satisfy by judgment mid executioil against
either Mr. Holley and any separate property which have had, or against the
community property of Mr. and Mrs. Holley. Id at 11l Idaho 349, 352 - 353.
(emphasis supplied)
By analogy, Sandy Moulton in this case was not a party to the obligation that was
incurred that gave rise to the initial complaint in this matter. Ms. Moulton also was not a
member of the marital community to which the obligation attached, as alleged in the initial
complaint. As in the Twin fills case, in the instant case there was no connection between Ms.
Moulton and the underlying obligation or the judgment that was obtained evidencing the
underlying obligation.

Assuming arguendo the absence of Idaho Code § 11-204, Idaho recognizes not only the
equal management and control of the community property by either spouse (Idaho Code § 32912); it also recognizes that each spouse has an undivided one-half interest in all community
property. See, e.g., Suchan v. Suchan, 113 Idaho 102, 741 P.2d 1289 (Idaho 1986); Mason v.

Pelkes, 57 Idaho 10, 59 P.2d 1087 (Idaho 1936). To extend the logic of the Twin Falls case, Ms.
Moulton, though she had equal management and control of the present community property, she
did not have any management or control of the previous marital community of Lecheminants.
Ms. Moulton was a complete stranger to the judgment obtained by CBEI and there is no
evidence that there was any disclosure of said judgment by Mr. Lecheminant to Ms. Moulton of
the judgment.

To allow the execution and garnishment of Ms. Moulton's interest in the

community property she earned by her labor is to imply that upon her marriage to Mr.
Lecheminant she consented to all of his ante-nuptial debts and that her share of t l ~ ecommunity
property could be executed upon - the equivalent of implied or constructive consent. This
conclusion flies in the face of what should be sound public policy. In the teachings or the Twin

Falls case, it was noted that creditors should follow the usual procedures for collections of their
debiq, i.e. judgment and judgment debtor. The Twin Falls case also points out what should be
inherent in this case; that the creditor should seek to satisfy the debt from the property of the
debtor spouse and from the property of Lisa Lecheminant. In this case, there has been no
showing that the creditor first attempted to satisfy the debt from the separate property of the
judgment debtors (Jeff Lecheminant and Lisa Lecheminant) or from non-exempt community
property of the judgment debtors. Under the teachings of the Tiviiz Falls case cited supra, the

debt ought to follow the property of the judgment debtors. Likewise, there have been no
allegations of any fraudulent transfers of property by Mr. Lecheminant or by Lisa Lecheminant
to prevent recovery for CBEI.
In this case, the judgment creditor is seeking a windfall upon the formation of a new
marital community. As stated, the separate property of the judgment debtors and the non-exempt
commuility property of the new colnmunity is still available to the judgment creditor for
satisfaction of this debt. This exact situation is why the exemption was created (no knowledge,
no control and no management). The logic is reinforced if this Court, by the doctrine of
extension, provides the same cove of protection to married men.

C.

I.C. § 32-912 DOES NOT ALLOW THE GARNISHMENT IN THIS CASE.
Appellant has asserted that pursuant to I.C.

5 32-912 the antenuptial debts of one spouse

binds the colnmunity property and thus makes the community assets available for execution.
This section states that "Either the husband or the wife shall have the right to manage and colltrol
the community property and either may bind the community by contract . . ." The Appellant's
argument is misplaced since the debt and judgment arose prior to the inception and existence of
the present community (with Ms. Moulton). The debts at issue in this case were not incurred
during the existence of this community. The non-debtor spouse (Sandy Moulton) was not a party
to the collection action against her husband and yet the Appellant has attempted to execute on the
non-party, non-debtor's spouse's interest in the present conmunity property in violation of her
due process rights. Sandy Moulton did not have any notice of this debt and did not have any
opportunity to contest its validity. The only procedural safeguard was the exemption supplied by

I.C.

5

11-204 and the attendant exemption hearing. But for the exemption hearing, her property

interests would have been unilaterally taken. Her property would have been talcen without CBEI
posting a bond, without an application to a judge (the garnishment is signed by the County
Sheriff) (the Writ of Execution only refers to the defendants, not to Sandy Moulton) and no
showing of probable cause (to prevail). The dicta of Bliss now reveals itself in real life and
extended to maturity in the hands of a zealous collector.

D.

THE DEBT WAS NOT INCURRED FOR THE BENEFIT OF "THIS"
COMMUNITY.
Since the Appellant in this case attempted to garnish Ms. Moulton's wages, which are

exempt community per I.C. § 11-204, the question then becomes whether or not a judgment
creditor can attach the exempt community property of Ms. Moulton to satisfy the antenuptial
debt of Ms. Moulton's present husband where she was neither a party nor judgment debtor to or
in the original case or in the original debtor marital community. Courts in Idaho have held that if
the debt was incurred for the benefit of the community then the debt can be paid from the
community property. The debt which gave rise to this action arose before the present marital
community of Ms. Moulton and Mr. Lecheminant was formed and was not incurred for the
benefit of the community of Ms. Moulton and Mr. Lecheminant. The present community,
therefore, is not obligated to repay such debts from this particular community property (wages),
which is the exempt community property of Ms. Moulton under I.C.

5 11-204.

The United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (applying Idaho law) in a matter
regarding a foreclosure action stated, "Only if the debt is incurred for the benefit of the

community does I.C.

5 32-912 allow satisfaction of the unpaid debt from the community

property." First Idaho Couporation v. Davis, 867 F.2d 1241, 1243 (9"' Cir. 1989). In Freeburn

v. Fueeburn, 97 Idaho 845, 849, 555 P.2d 385, 389 (1976) the Court held "The character of an
item of property as com~nunityor separate vests at the time of its acquisition." (Citations
omitted).

This is the logic that must be followed here, that the debt acquired by Mr.

Lecheminant is separate in character since it was vested prior to the formatioli of the new
community; or the debt is a community debt of a former community that cannot be satisfied out
of the "present" special kind of comlnunity property created by LC. Fj 11-204.

E.

THE PNNCIPLE OF EXTENSION PROTECTS THE WAGES OF SANDY
MOULTON.
Upon reviewing Idaho case law, none have addressed the specific question as to whether

or not the special kind of conlmunity property created by LC. § 11-204, including wages, can be
attached by a judgment creditor to satisfy an antenuptial debt of the debtor spouse. However,
there is case law indicating that community property classified under I.C. § 11-204 cannot be
used for that purpose.

The subject debt was not incurred for the benefit of this present

community, the debt was not acquired during the existence of this present conmlunity, and its
very nature is separate in character in regard to the present community.
Further, "[a] party challenging a statute on constitutional grounds bears the burden of
proving the statute is unconstitutional and must overcome a strong presumption of validity." In

Re: Karel, 144 Idaho 379, 162 P.3d 758,762 (2007).

Idaho Code § 11-204 (the main portion in existence since 1864) has never been totally
stricken by the Idaho Legislature or overturned by this Court. By symmetry of reasoning it must
be assumed that I.C. 3 11-204 applies equally to married men as it does married woman. This
principle of extension has been approved in Idaho law. See e.g., Murphey v. Murphey, 103 Idaho
720, 653 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1982); Neveau v. Neveau, 103 Idaho 707, 652 P.2d 655 (Ct. App.
1982); Harrigfeld v. District Court, 95 Idaho 540, 511 P.2d 822 (1973). In the Murphey case,
this Court, in addressing a similar situation (alimony statute in favor of women) stated:
It is apparent that the legislature would have intended that the benefits of the
alimony statute should be extended to the excluded class, rather than taken from
the benefitted class, and we should therefore extend those benefits in order that
the legislative will, albeit not giffed with omniscience, should be carried out.
If an important congressional policy is to be perpetuated by recasting
unconstitutional legislation, the analytically sound approach is to accept
responsibility for [the] decision. Its justification cannot be by resort to legislative
intent, as that term is loosely employed, but by a different kind of legislative
intent, namely the presumed grant of power to the courts to decide whether it
more nearly accords with congress' wishes to eliminate its policy altogether or
extend it in order to render what congress plainly did intend, constitutional.
Welch v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 355-56, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 1804, 26 L.Ed.2d
308 (1970) (Harland, J., concurring).
The court in Oru implicitly recognized that alimony statutes are to be considered
as providing a benefit to the receiver of the alimony when it is stated that . . ., as
the state could respond to a reversal by neutrally extending alimony rights to
needy husbands as well as wives. (Citations omitted).
On remand froin the Supreme Court, the Alabama Court of Appeals in fact
responded to reversal by neutrally extending alimony rights to needy husbands as
well as wives. (Citations omitted) Id at 103 Idaho 720,723-24.
In Harvigfield cited above, this Court stated:

A holding that a statutory classification scheme constitutes a denial of equal
protection because it unconstitutionally grants a benefit to one class while
denying it to another, does not necessarily mandate a denial of the benefit to both
classes. Harrideld 11 District Court, 95 Idaho 540, 545, 511 P.2d 822, 827
(1973).
If one reviews tile legislative history and intents and purposes of the overall domestic
relation scheme in Idaho, one can conclude that extension naturally should flow in and to the
instant situation. As already observed in this brief, and as observed by the Appellant in its brief,
the idea and outgrowth of the exemption is tied to the managemeilt and coiltrol of the marital
community and that the exemption ought to be linked to the management and control of the
marital community, or a portion of the marital community. From 1915 to 1974, by statute, a
wife had the exclusive management and control of her earnings, not her husband. Therefore,
there was a linkage between management and control and the exemption as found in Idaho Code

5 11-204.

In 1974, we had the advent of mutual ma~lagemeiltand control of the community by

the marital partners (I.C. § 32-912). It is inherent in equal management and control that there is
an implied consent by and between the marital partners that either partner can bind the lnarital
community. In the instant case, Sandy Moulton did not have any knowledge of, let alone any
implied consent as to the antenuptial debt that is present in this case. Given the implications of
knowledge, consent, managemei~t,and control, should it be validly concluded that the benefits
that are provided by Idaho Code

5

11-204 should be terminated to married women in a

subsequent marital comn~unitywho now benefit by the statute? It is our argument that the
benefit should not be terminated. The clear legislative purpose was to link knowledge, consent,
inanage~neiitand control to this "special kind of colmnunity property." It was to provide a

married woman with some protection from debts that she had no control over or had no input in
regard to the creation of said debt. The statute is to provide help to the spouse without
knowledge or control over the debt and preserve the economic status of the marriage, pending
further developments. The purposes of the statute would be thwarted by an invalidation of Idaho
Code

5 11-204. However, by extending the statute's benefit to married men in the same

situation, the legislative purposes of Idaho Code 5 11-204 would be effectuated. See, e.g., Peters
v. Narick, 270 S.E.2d 760,767 (W.Va. 1980).
The policy of an exemption also argues for the application of the extension doctrine.
The underlying policy of an exemption is that a person should be entitled to some minimum
amount of property and income to maintain a subsistence level to lessen the risk of that person
becoming a ward of the state. The recognition of how important wages and earnings are to the
financial viability of a person is found in the Federal Wage Garnishment Law, Consumer
Protection Credit Acts, Title I11 (CCPA) (See, also, Idaho Code

5

28-45-104 (Limitation on

Garnishment)).
It is the position of the instant author that havoc would result from the voiding of Idaho
Code 5 11-204 in respect to earnings, inasmuch as the voiding would impose as much a hardship
on husbands similarly situated as with wives. Why would this Court wish to impose economic
and social hardship upon any class, when it would appear that with the passage of the 1974 equal
management and control of community property, that the legislature intended to extend the
benefits to husbands as well as to wives in the situation posed by the instant case.

The exemption provided by I.C.

5 11-204 is to be

construed liberally in favor of the

debtor. See e.g., In Re Moore, 269 BR 864 (BR D. Idaho 2001). In this case the exemption
should be construed even more liberally in favor of Ms. Moulton and be extended to married
men. For Ms Moulton, because she is not the debtor, or a party to this suit, and was not even
when the debt was incurred. For married men because many will
married to Jeff Leche~~linant
find themselves in the same situation as Ms. Moulton without any procedural safeguard but for
the exemption. If Appellant's argument is accepted and Ms. Moulton is not granted the
exemption given to her per LC. § 11-204, married womei-i and men will effectively have no
management and no control over their earnings when in a new marital community and will
without any procedural safeguards as to the garnishment of their wages.

F.

SANDY MOULTON'S WAGES ARE NOT SUBJECT TO GARNISHMENT PER
THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING IN MILLER V. MILLER, 113
rmrro 41s (1987).

In Miller v. Miller, 113 Idaho 415, 420, 745 P.2d 294, 299 (1987) this Court stated and
held:
After the entry of the district court's judgment for damages against E. Paul, Pete
filed pursuant to I.C. 5 8-509 (Supp. 1987) a motion for colrtinuing garnishment
against the wages of E. Paul's spouse, Paula Miller. Followi~lga hearing, the
court denied the motion on the ground of Pete's failure to name Paula as a party
defendant. The district court reasoned that allowing a garnishment of Paula's
wages without having been made a party defendant, and with the judgment having
been entered only against her husband, would deny her due process of law. We
agree with the district court's conclusion that the joinder of a spouse as a party
defendant was a necessary prerequisite, under LC. 5 8-509(b) . . .
The language of I.C. 5 8-509 is specifically limited to a "judgment creditor" and a
"judgment debtor." "A well-settled rule of construction is that the words of a
statute must be given their plain, usual and ordinary nleaning in the absence of

any ambiguity." (Citations omitted). A judgment debtor according to Black's
Law Dictionary (5thed. 1979), p. 758 is, "A person against whom judgment has
been recovered, and which remains unsatisfied." Paula, having not been a named
party defendant, clearly did not qualify as a judgment debtor and, hence, was not
within the scope of LC. 5 8-509(b).
The Miller case is closely analogous to the matter at hand. In this case, Sandy Moultou
was not a party defendant and is not a "judgment debtor" just as Paula Miller in the Miller case.
If this Court would not allow a continuing garnishment against someone who is not a "judgment
debtor" then why would it allow a notice of garnishment against someone who is not a "judgment
debtor" and a stranger to the debt? It is Moulton's and EIRMC's position that Miller stands for
the proposition that garnishment of any type can only be effected against persons who are
actually party defendants in a suit and are judgment debtors. Therefore, because Sandy Moulton
was not a party defendant in this matter and no judgment was entered against her, the wages of
Sandy Moulton cannot be garnished.
In the District Court's opinion, citation is made to Idaho Code § 11-201. Based upon the
Court's language in its citation to this statute, it is assumed by this author that the Court was
referring to Idaho Code § 11-201 for its definition of what property was subject to seizure (all
goods, chattels, moneys and other property, both real and personal, or any interest therein of the
judgment debtor, not exempt by law, and all property and rights of property, seized and held
under attachment in the action, are liable to execution) (emphasis supplied). What the District
Court overlooked is the legislative history of Idaho Code

11-20 1. It was passed and enacted at

the same time and in the same legislative act as Idaho Code

11-204. This means that both

statutes would have to be viewed as a legislative whole. See e.g., St. Lukes Regional Medical

Center v. Board oJCounty Conzinissioner ofAda County, 146 Idaho 753, 203 P.3d 683 (2009).
The legislature completely understood that they had created a special type of property for women
and that 11-201 cotzld not be used to seize that property, when 11-204 specifically shielded it
from seizure. Therefore, given the legislative history and intent of what property is liable for
seizure and what property is not liable to seizure, the special type of property shielded fiom
seizure in $ 11-204 would not be subject to garnishment in this action, either by operation of
legislative construction or by the operation of the doctrine of extension.'

6.

THE CASE OF ACTION COLLECTION SERVICES, IINC.,
CONTROLLING IN THE INSTANT CASE.

IS

NOT

The case of Action Collectioiz Services, Inc. v. Seele, 138 Idaho 753, 69 P.3d 173 (Ct.
App. 2003) does not aid the court in its determination of the instant appeal.
There are multiple factual and legal differences between the case at the bar and the

Action Collection Services, Inc. case. Most of these issues have been addressed in previous
sections; however, to recapitulate those differences, the court should consider the following:
1.

111Action Collection Services, Inc., Seele was the judgment debtor.

2.

Seele did not dispute that she was colltractually liable for the debts encompassed

by the Action judgment.
3.

There is absolutely no discussion in the Action Collectioiz Services, Inc. case of

the exemption granted by I.C. $1 1-204.

1 The act that gave the Idaho Territory both present code sections 11-201 and 11-204 were actually passed in
Idaho's f r s t territorial session as Sections 220 and 221. See General Laws of Idaho, Title VII, $5 220 and 221,
respectively (Dec. 1863 to Feb. 1864). This means the exemption in 5 11-204 predates col~ununityproperty in
Idaho. h4y regrets to Professor Brockelba~~lc.

4.

In the instant case, Sandy Moulton is not the judgment debtor.

5.

Sandy Moulton is not liable for the underlying debts that encompass the judgment

in the instant case.
What the Appellant wants is a simple equation: the earnings in dispute are community
property and community property is subject to garnishment. This is not true in all cases under all
circumstances.

The Miller case cited above indicates that the mechanism of obtaining

garnishment is limited to judgment creditors and judgment debtors in certain circumstances.
Sandy Moulton does not fit into the category of a judgment debtor, indeed, Sandy Moulton is in
the same situation of the judgment debtor's new husband who was not named in the Action

Collection Services, Inc. case. There is a reason for that: garnishment would not work in regard
to an individual not responsible for the underlying debt and not named as a party (iudgment

debtor) in the judgment.
In summary, the Action Collection Services, Inc. case only serves to show the complete
disconnect in the instant case between a judgment creditor and a party who is not responsible for
the debt and is not susceptible to garnishment in as much as the individual is not a judgment
debtor.

N.

THE PLAINTIFFIAPPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTTORNEY'S FEES.
In approaching the question of attorney's fees, the Court is aware that Idaho follows

what is commonly known as the American Rule, "that attorney's fees are to be awarded only
where they are authorized by statute or contract." Hiller v. Cenarusa, 106 Idaho 571, 578, 682
P.2d 525 (1984). The party asserting the claim for attorney's fees has the burden of directing the

Court's attention to either a statute or a contract between the parties authorizing the award of
attorney's fees.
In the instant case, the PlaintifflAppellant places special emphasis upon Idaho Code

5

12-120(5). Thc basis for the award of attorney's fees in the Coinplaint are identified as Idaho
Code $5 12-120(1) and 12-120(3).
A close reading of both subsectioll (1) and (3) of Idaho Code

5

12-120 reveals that

attorney's fees cannot be awarded in this case, inasmuch as the person who filed the Claim of
Exemption and has followed through with this case is Sandy Moulton and EIRMC, not one of
the named defendants in the instant case. See R. p. 25. See R. p. 40. Neither Sandy Moulton or
EIRMC received a demand letter in regard to the amounts claimed by the PlaintiffIAppellant, as
required under Idaho Code 3 12-120(1). Indeed, neither sandy Moulton or EIRMC was a party
to the action initiated by the filing of ihe Compiaint in tile instant matter.
Likewise, neither Sandy Moulton or EIRMC was the object of the Plaintiffs in seeking to
recover on a11 open acco~~llt,
account stated, nore, bill, negotiable instrument, guarantee or
contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods . . . . (I.C.

5 12-120(3))

Therefore, the underlying predicates for the triggering of Idaho Code 5 12-120(5) are not
found in the instant case.
In the instant case, you have two conlplete strangers to the judgment, Sandy Moulton and
EIRMC, who filed the Claim of Exemption and thereafter opposed the collection of Sandy
Moulton's community property from her e~nployer.

Based upon the foregoing, the Respondents, Sandy Moulton and EIRMC, respectfully
request that PlaintiffiAppellant's attorney fee request be denied.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the analysis, case law precedent, and statutes set forth above, Sandy Moulton
and EIRMC respectfully requests that this Court deny appellant's appeal in all respects.

*.Iof July, 2009.
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